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Key Points
• The energy transition will be mineral intensive: 
production of certain critical minerals is estimated to 
increase by more than 450% by 2050. The mining and 
metals sector already contributes 5–7% of greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions globally and, as production 
increases, so too will emissions linked to the sector. 
• Although fragile states in Africa contribute minimally 
to GHG emissions, they have a high degree of 
vulnerability to the impacts of climate change. 
Governments can and should mobilize the mining 
sector to play a meaningful role in meeting their 
climate mitigation and adaptation needs and those of 
project–affected communities. The increased demand 
for critical minerals to produce renewable energy 
and battery solutions tends to increase investment 
flows into the mining sector of several of those states, 
making it all the more crucial for their governments 
to ensure that new mining investments support 
sustainable development objectives. Requiring mining 
companies to contribute to sustainable development 
objectives, including climate objectives, can 
increase a country’s competitiveness in international 
markets, leverage the sector’s contribution to GHG 
emissions reductions, and minimize its impact 
on the country’s environment and communities.
• Recognizing that laws are the ideal legal instrument 
to regulate the mining sector’s contribution to climate 
mitigation and adaptation, governments may still 
consider updating model mining development 
agreements (MMDAs), or negotiating climate -related 
contractual provisions, as a stop-gap measure in the 
absence of relevant laws. In this paper, we explore 
whether governments are using, and how they can 
use, investor–state contracts to advance climate goals 
in the context of the mining sector. 
• Based on our review of publicly available mining 
contracts signed by five fragile states in Africa 
(Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, 
Mozambique, and Sierra Leone) post–Paris Agreement, 
we conclude that in large part the contracts reviewed 
do not include climate-related provisions. Robust 
climate provisions may be absent because these 
issues are regulated by laws rather than contracts.
• Though an exhaustive review of climate-related laws 
was outside the scope of this research, we found that 
some fragile states in Africa include climate-related 
provisions in law to varying degrees. For example, 
Guinea’s 2019 Environmental Code encourages all 
companies, including in the mining sector, to use 
renewable energy and mandates the environment 
minister to implement the National Strategy for 
Climate Change Adaptation.
• We synthesize our findings and recommendations for 
six categories of contractual provisions, considering 
the most critical climate-related impacts and 
contributions of mining projects. Though the analysis 
focuses on contracts concluded by five fragile states 
in Africa, our policy recommendations are general 
in nature and apply to all host governments that 
do not already have robust laws in place to ensure 
that the mining sector contributes to climate 
change mitigation and adaptation objectives. 
Our recommendations for governments updating 
their model mining development agreement or 
negotiating contractual provision are as follows:
o Integrate renewable energy into mining 
projects. Governments can support increased 
renewable power integration by requiring mining 
companies to use renewable energy sources. No 
evidence of this practice was found in the contracts 
reviewed.
o Reduce deforestation. To restrict forest 
conversion, governments could require mining 
companies to account for direct, indirect, and 
induced impacts on forests at every stage of the 
operations, as well as systematically applying the 
mitigation hierarchy throughout the life-cycle of the 
mine. The absence of provisions on deforestation 
in the contracts analyzed may be because this 
aspect is regulated by laws rather than contracts.
o Require a climate risk assessment and 
community vulnerability assessment. Mining 
contracts should expressly require mines to 
comply with national adaptation plans (NAPs) 
and climate adaptation guidelines where such 
instruments have been developed by the host 
country. Community development requirements 
contained in community development agreements 
(CDAs) should require mining companies to 
incorporate climate change adaptation strategies 
when requested by affected communities. None 
of the contracts reviewed includes provisions on 
climate change adaptation strategies.
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o Regulate water use. Governments should 
expressly condition the grant of water rights 
to mining companies on stringent obligations 
regarding water use efficiency, include penalties 
for water overuse or release of non-treated waste 
water, and provide for a grievance mechanism for 
downstream communities whose water rights are 
impacted. The contract should include obligations 
for the mine to create shared-use opportunities 
to increase the access to water for communities 
and reserve the government’s ability to alter 
water allocation to mining operations based on 
fluctuations in the amount of available water and 
the number of users reliant on the water source. 
The absence of provisions on water use in the 
contracts reviewed may be because this aspect is 
regulated by laws rather than contracts.
o Require tailings dam design justifications. The 
risk of tailings dam failure, exacerbated by climate 
change, can be significantly reduced by requiring 
companies to justify their tailings dam design. 
None of the contracts reviewed includes detailed 
provisions on tailings dams. The contract should 
ban dams upstream of communities and require 
that the mining plan demonstrate that the tailings 
dam follows the latest global safety standards 
and that ongoing maintenance and remediation 
activities will be conducted. Companies should 
model the risk of tailings dam failure due to 
climate-related risks in the environmental 
and social impact assessment (ESIA); and, the 
environmental management plan (EMP) should 
include the obligation to demonstrate that the 
tailings dam is adequately monitored for failure 
risk, with the goal of achieving zero failures. Tailings 
storage should use the best available technology. 
Relevant provisions only appear in eight of 
the contracts and are very limited in scope.
o Integrate climate risks into closure plans. 
While more than half of the contracts analyzed 
require mining companies to plan in advance for 
the closure of the mine and the environmental 
rehabilitation of the mine site, none requires 
them to integrate climate risks into closure plans. 
Contracts should:
o Mandate that closure plans be submitted at the 
beginning of the project along with the ESIA. 
o Describe how the company intends to avoid 
or mitigate the environmental impacts 
associated with halting its operations. 
o Include rehabilitation strategies that reflect an 
understanding of the changing relationship 
between the ecosystem and the climate.
o Require companies to model the long-term 
sustainability of rehabilitation projects. 
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can and should mobilize the mining sector to play a 
meaningful role in meeting their climate mitigation 
and adaptation needs and those of project-affected 
communities. In addition, the increased demand for 
critical minerals to produce renewable energy and 
battery solutions tends to increase investment flows 
into the mining sector of several of those fragile states,12 
making it all the more crucial for their governments 
to ensure that new mining investments support each 
country’s sustainable development goals. Doing so, 
with respect to climate action, furthers both a country’s 
competitiveness in international markets13 and minimize 
the mining sector’s footprint on the country’s environment 
and communities.
Though our analysis focuses on contracts concluded 
by fragile states in Africa, the policy recommendations 
that we draw from their analysis apply to all host 
governments that do not already have robust laws that 
operationalize mitigation and adaptation goals and are 
eager to leverage and strengthen the role of their mining 
sectors in achieving sustainable development. 
Our recommendations envision generating long-term 
savings over the life of the mines, even if some of those 
recommendations may in practice represent higher 
upfront costs for mining companies. For example, 
adopting renewable energy sources, though possibly 
more expensive at the outset, is more cost-effective 
than fossil fuels considering the life of a mine.14 Avoiding 
deforestation early on also generates savings for mining 
companies when the time comes to fulfill their mine 
closure and rehabilitation obligations. Furthermore, by 
supporting community efforts to build resilience to climate 
change, mining companies have the opportunity to 
meaningfully contribute to project-affected communities.
Attention to climate change considerations that entail 
higher expenditures by mining investors at the initial 
stages of the operation of a mine also tend to reduce the 
tax revenues from mining for host governments in the 
short term. However, for governments, too, the long-term 
benefits outweigh the initial revenue reductions. As long 
as governments put strong progressive fiscal regimes in 
place,15 they will be able to reap the upside from a climate-
aware, low-carbon mining sector that will be more 
profitable than a business-as-usual, carbon-intensive 
mining sector in the medium to long term. 
1 Introduction 
At the 2015 Paris Climate Change Conference, the world’s 
governments set an ambitious goal of limiting global 
temperature rise to 1.5 °C over pre-industrial levels. To 
meet this goal, global anthropogenic CO2 emissions 
must decline steadily and reach net zero by about 
2050.2 The pathway to a low-carbon future requires a 
fundamental shift away from fossil fuels and toward 
clean energy technologies. 
This transition will be mineral-intensive: the World Bank 
estimates that the production of minerals could increase 
by more than 450% by 2050 to meet the growing demand 
for clean energy technologies.3 How these minerals are 
produced will have a lasting effect on the clean energy 
transition. The mining and metal sector contributes 
4–7% of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions globally.4 
Without adequate regulation to incentivize climate-
friendly sustainable operations, increases in mineral 
extraction risk increasing the sector’s carbon footprint.5 
In addition, climate change acts as a risk multiplier by 
increasing the risk of flooding, drought, and landslides 
and, as such, exacerbates the negative externalities 
caused by poor mining practices. 
First and foremost, climate change considerations should 
be incorporated into the climate, environmental, water, 
forestry, energy, or mining laws of mineral-rich countries. 
For example, in 2016, Kenya passed a climate law that 
requires climate mainstreaming in all sectors.6 Guinea’s 
2019 Environmental Code encourages the use of renew able 
energy wherever possible and mandates the environment 
minister to implement the National Strategy for Climate 
Change Adaptation.7 But the pace of legislative processes 
is often slow—and in countries where the legislation does 
not include climate change mitigation and adaptation 
requirements,8 countries may turn to contractual provi-
sions to compel the mining sector to shift to climate-
sensitive practices. This paper assesses the extent to 
which this is being done through an analysis of all publicly 
available mining contracts signed by fragile states in Africa9 
after the adoption of the Paris Agreement in December 2015 
that appear on ResourceContracts.org (21 contracts).10 
Though the magnitude of African fragile states’ contri-
bution to global GHG emissions is minimal, these states 
have a comparatively high degree of vulnerability to the 
impacts of climate change.11 In this context, governments 
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2 Climate-Related Provisions in 
Investor–State Contracts
Even as awareness of the mining sector’s positive and 
negative contributions to climate change has increased, 
countries have not included robust climate provisions 
in the mining contracts analyzed. The absence of robust 
climate provisions may be because the sector’s role in 
climate change mitigation and adaptation is regulated 
by laws rather than contracts. Where it is not, mineral-
rich governments may seek to include climate-related 
provisions in investor –state contracts, including those 
concluded based on model mining development 
agreements (MMDAs). For example, investor–state 
mining contracts can include specific provisions to 
promote sustainable, climate-friendly mining practices, 
regulating the most critical climate-related impacts and 
contributions of mining projects. The following sections 
highlight six categories of provisions that may be included. 
These categories fall under climate change mitigation 
(requirements to minimize the use of fossil fuels, 
integrate the use of low-carbon energy sources, minimize 
deforestation, and restore forest cover) and adaptation 
(requirements to conduct climate risk and community 
vulnerability assessments, reduce water use, and 
design climate-resilient tailings dams and closure plans).
In addition, international standards can be incorporated 
into investor–state contracts to regulate certain aspects 
of investor behavior. For instance, ten of the reviewed 
contracts incorporate the International Finance 
Corporation’s (IFC) Performance Standards.16 While 
robust climate-related international standards do not 
yet exist to regulate mining projects, we expect existing 
standards to be updated or new ones developed 
given the global decarbonization agenda. 
2.1 Climate Change Mitigation
2.1.1 Energy Sources
Mining operations account for 2–11% of global energy 
consumption.17 The sector’s energy consumption is largely 
fossil fuel-based; renewables have constituted less than 
10% of total energy consumption since 1971.18 As demand 
for minerals increases and ore grades decline, the mining 
sector’s energy needs are projected to increase by more 
than a third by 2035.19
Governments have an opportunity to require that mining 
companies fulfill their increased energy needs through 
renewable sources, but our review found no evidence 
of this practice in any of the contracts reviewed. Six of 
the contracts reviewed include provisions that explicitly 
permit mining companies to build energy-related 
infrastructure, but none of these provisions required such 
infrastructure to produce clean energy.20 Moreover, four 
of the contracts provide custom duty exemptions on 
fossil fuels.21 Financial incentives, including fossil fuel 
subsidies, often lock in the sector’s reliance on fossil 
fuels. Compared to diesel, renewables have relatively 
high upfront capital costs but are competitive on a non-
subsidized basis. Although diesel plants have much higher 
operating costs, generous subsidies make fossil fuels an 
artificially attractive energy source; in addition, mining 
companies are often exempt from taxes on fuels used for 
off-road operations and energy generation.22 Requiring 
use of renewable energy sources through contracts is 
one way to recalibrate incentives and support increased 
renewable power integration. To do this, governments 
may consider the following: 
• Require companies to demonstrate in the 
mining plan that their designs are energy 
efficient and integrate renewable energy to the 
extent practicable.
• Require environmental impact assessments to 
include the modeling of GHG emissions, including 
from deforestation over the life of the mine (see 
the deforestation section below).
• Require companies to develop both a business-
as-usual model, showing the trajectory that 
GHG emissions would follow in absence of any 
measures to reduce them, and a model showing 
how much emissions need to be reduced for the 
mine to achieve carbon neutrality in line with a 
1.5 °C trajectory.
• Require environmental management plans to 
include all necessary measures over the life of the 
mine to achieve carbon neutrality in line with a 
1.5°C trajectory. These measures may include the 
use of renewables-based electricity or green 
hydrogen in lieu of fossil fuels in mining 
operations, energy efficiency improvements, 
deployment of energy
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storage solutions, and even carbon capture and 
storage in case of heavy downstream processes.23
• Require companies to measure and disclose GHG 
emissions in accordance with accepted standards 
(e.g. the GHG Protocol24). 
• Require mines to electrify surrounding 
communities using renewable power. This 
approach can be taken at a low marginal cost to 
the company while also fulfilling the important 
development objective of extending electricity to 
energy -poor communities.
• Do not include clauses that provide fossil fuel 
subsidies (e.g. through customs duty exemptions) 
in future contracts.
2.1.2 Deforestation
About half of active mines operate in forest landscapes.25 
Of these, more than half are located in low-income or 
lower middle–income countries.26 Mining operations can 
result in significant deforestation as companies clear 
forests to build mines and surrounding infrastructure. 
Mining accounts for about 7% of total forest loss across 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and is associated with a 
decline in the quality and quantity of ecosystem services.27 
Mining-driven deforestation is likely to increase: in recent 
years, twenty or more new mines in forest landscapes 
have been commissioned annually, compared to four to 
ten during the 1980s.28
Ongoing deforestation has significant implications for 
climate change. Forests store vast amounts of carbon; 
when they are cleared or burned, their stored carbon is 
released into the atmosphere. Forestry and other land 
use activities have historically accounted for about a third 
of anthropogenic CO2 emissions,
29 and between 2007–
2016 close to 23% of total anthropogenic GHG emissions 
derive from these activities.30 Reductions to forest cover 
directly affect local surface temperatures and can affect 
temperature and rainfall in regions hundreds of kilometers 
away.31 Additionally, deforestation can accelerate soil 
erosion by up to 1,000 times, leading to an increased risk 
of landslides and flooding in certain regions.32
A third of contracts reviewed are silent on deforestation.33 
This is not surprising as deforestation is typically handled 
in legislation, including in our sample of countries. It 
is notable, however, that some contracts appear to 
allow unlimited forest conversion.34 Others require prior 
authorization before cutting or logging protected forests.35 
Two contracts require reforestation or revegetation 
of land at the end of operations, where suitable.36
Restricting forest conversion through contract terms is 
particularly necessary in the absence of robust legislation 
that regulates the use of forested land.37 To do this, 
governments may consider requiring mining companies 
to account for direct, indirect, and induced impacts on 
forests at every stage of the operations, including in the 
mining plan, the environmental impact assessment 
(EIA), and the environmental management plan (EMP), 
as well as systematically applying the mitigation 
hierarchy through the life of the mine.38 
• The mining plan, for example, should require 
companies to collect data to establish a baseline39 
and provide the government with an accurate, 
third-party verified survey of forested land within 
the concession area. 
• Under the EMP, companies could be required to 
formally report their forest conversion activities 
and conduct internal audits to demonstrate that 
they are achieving no net loss or net gain.40 
• In cases where the contract area includes areas 
that should remain permanently forested (due 
to zoning errors, for example), the contract 
should also specify that these areas must remain 
permanently forested and provide clear penalties 
for violations. 
• Additionally, a requirement of complete or partial 
reforestation should be included as part of the 
closure plan.41 
2.2 Climate Change Adaptation
2.2.1 Climate Risk Assessment and Community 
Vulnerability Assessment
Climate change adaptation in a mining context refers 
to how mining companies can incorporate climate 
considerations into mining processes, practices, and 
structures to mitigate climate-related risks.42 It relates to 
the company’s “ability to adapt to changes, anticipate 
what might happen next, and absorb weather and 
climate-related shocks when they happen.”43 Importantly, 
climate change adaptation also refers to the role of mining 
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companies in strengthening the resilience of mining-
affected communities to climate-related impacts.
Climate change poses risks to the mining sector and 
mining-affected communities with the increased 
frequency and intensity of severe weather events that 
affect mining operations both directly—in terms of mine 
closures, damage to infrastructure, access to water, and 
more dangerous working conditions—and indirectly, 
when their supply chains are similarly impacted. At the 
same time, integrating climate adaptation strategies 
into the lifecycle of a mining project can improve mine 
performance and efficiency, thereby reducing costs and 
even increasing revenues, including for the government 
through tax revenues. 
Climate change can exacerbate vulnerabilities in 
host communities where droughts, floods, increasing 
temperatures, and natural disasters lead to a loss of 
livelihood, food shortages, crop failures, the spread 
of diseases, and worsening social conditions.44 The 
presence of a mine can also negatively impact community 
resilience. Engaging with mining-affected communities 
to build their resilience to the impacts of climate change 
is fundamentally important for mining companies 
to maintain their social license and meet public 
expectations regarding corporate responsibility. 
A climate adaptation strategy will ensure that mining-
related assets are better able to withstand more frequent 
and severe climate events (see, for example, the Tailings 
Dams section below). It will also help to mitigate the 
project’s impact on the surrounding environment and 
community, including water supply (see the Water 
section below), during the life of the mine and/or post-
closure (see the Closure Plans section below). A climate 
adaptation strategy is most effective where mining 
companies integrate climate change considerations 
into their own corporate strategies and then make 
investment, construction, and operational decisions 
based on best practices of global climate change 
models tailored to local, site-specific conditions.45
None of the contracts reviewed includes provisions that 
relate to climate adaptation strategies. 
Mining contracts should expressly require mines to 
comply with the national adaptation plans (NAPs) and 
climate adaptation guidelines when such instruments 
have been developed by the host country.46 
Moreover, in the context of the EIA and EMP, mining 
companies should be required to assess climate risks 
and impacts and develop management plans to address 
them. In the same way that contracts often prescribe the 
contents of an EIA and EMP, they could similarly define 
what a climate risk assessment and related management 
plan entail. The climate risk assessment exercise entails 
defining critical thresholds and then assessing when and 
where critical thresholds could be exceeded triggering 
intolerable risks. Such thresholds could be “the available 
freeboard of a tailings dam, a maximum safe working 
temperature for personnel”47 or the maximum length of 
a drought period for local communities. The threshold 
should be anticipated as being exceeded with growing 
probability and intensity as time passes. The data on 
probability, frequency, and magnitude of extreme weather 
events should rely on changes to the weather across short 
(12 hours), medium (5 days), and longer (annual trends) 
terms.48 Moreover, the climate risk assessment should 
also cover incremental changes in climate conditions 
as these can affect the mining design and impact the 
surrounding environment on a cumulative basis. Lastly, 
the assessment should be conducted as if no adaptation 
measures were in place to apprehend maximum risk.49 
The identified risks and site-specific mitigation strategies 
in the EIAs should also inform EMPs used to assess and 
monitor mining operations. In the mining development 
plan, mining companies should demonstrate the 
integration of the result of the climate risk assessment into 
the decisions on where to locate mining assets and in the 
design of mining-related infrastructure. Risk mitigation 
strategies should be constantly revised to reflect the 
latest predictions.50 Emergency preparedness plans 
should also be put in place, reviewed, and updated to 
reflect best practices with respect to climate-related risks. 
Mining companies are also well placed to assist by 
engaging early on with communities to improve their 
resilience to climate-related risks. This could include 
helping to develop emergency planning practices and 
supporting communities to develop and implement 
climate change adaptation plans.51 In this regard, 
community development requirements contained in 
law or in community development agreements (CDAs) 
could require companies to contribute to community 
climate change adaptation strategies if communities 
deem it appropriate. For example, mining companies 
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could provide financial support and training to local 
communities for the communities to run a vulnerability 
assessment on their livelihood resources, develop 
adaptation measures, and to identify where the company 
could support communities’ resilience.52 These areas can 
be related to infrastructure, agriculture, water, health, and 
biodiversity, as well as emergency preparedness. 
2.2.2 Water Use 
Access to a stable water supply is crucial to mining 
operations. Water is required to suppress dust, process ore, 
cool and wash mining equipment, and manage tailings; 
without water, a mine cannot operate. Hard rock mining, 
in particular, involves a significant amount of water to 
separate and purify minerals. As mining operations expand 
to meet the mineral needs of the clean energy transition, 
the water footprint of the mining sector will increase. 
The six largest mining companies operate 70% of their 
mining projects in water-stressed regions.53 Water is 
already a source of conflict between mining companies 
and local communities, particularly when mines operate 
upstream of communities that rely on the same water 
source.54 More frequent droughts due to climate change 
could lead to severe water shortages and more frequent 
flooding during the rainy season. This could inundate 
mines, cause more closures, leach harmful chemicals into 
the environment, and destabilize infrastructure such that 
mines may collapse. 
Yet, out of the contracts reviewed that include water-
related provisions, most do not limit the amount of 
water mining companies may use or require that mining 
companies treat the water they use before discharging 
it.55 Like with deforestation, this is not surprising because 
water rights are usually established by legislation, 
including in our sample. 
In the absence of robust laws that regulate water use, 
governments should expressly condition the grant of 
water rights to mining companies on stringent obligations 
regarding water use efficiency.56 For example, in drafting 
the mining plan, companies should be required to 
demonstrate that they are using the most water-efficient 
designs, including planning for zero water waste and 
prioritizing water reuse over the request for water rights.57 
Additionally, the contract should include a penalty for 
water overuse or release of non-treated waste water and 
a grievance mechanism for downstream communities 
whose water rights are impacted. 
The contract should include obligations for the mine to 
create shared-use opportunities when developing a water 
solution for the mine to increase nearby communities’ 
access to water.58 
The contract should also reserve the government’s 
ability to alter water allocation to mining operations 
based on fluctuations in the amount of available water 
and the number of users reliant on the water source. 
Adjustments of this nature are statutorily authorized in 
South Africa, and other states could draw on these water 
use laws in drafting contract terms.59 Relatedly, the EIA 
should contain requirements to periodically assess the 
climate impacts on the mining region’s aquifer and adjust 
the mine’s water use rights accordingly.
2.2.3 Tailings Dams
Tailings are a common byproduct of mineral extraction 
and are typically stored as a slurry in dammed reservoirs. 
The properties of tailings vary according to the size and 
structure of the mined rock and the chemicals used in 
mineral processing. Tailings may range from highly toxic 
to relatively harmless, though most are acidic and contain 
high salt concentrations. As the mining sector expands 
and ore grades fall, tailings waste is set to increase.60
The stability of tailings storage facilities largely depends 
on consistent land and weather conditions. Global 
warming–related changes in precipitation patterns 
and ambient temperature will affect soil moisture and 
ground temperature, weakening tailings structures. 
Under hot and arid conditions, for example, water 
evaporation will concentrate tailings, accelerate acid 
mine drainage, and lead to widespread environmental 
contamination. In wetter climates, heavy rainfall may 
cause tailings dams to overflow or collapse.
When tailings dams fail, they may release millions of 
liters of toxic waste into the environment, resulting in 
water pollution, widespread destruction, and loss of 
life. Although the total number of tailings dam failures is 
declining, the risk of catastrophic tailings dam failures has 
been increasing since 1990.61 After 2000, the catastrophic 
failure rate has been about five or six serious failures 
every year.62 Approximately 25% of worldwide tailings 
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dam failures are the result of extreme weather events. 
This may increase as the effects of climate change 
become more acute.63
The risk of tailings dam failure can be greatly reduced 
by requiring mining companies to justify their tailings 
dam design. However, none of the contracts reviewed 
included detailed provisions on tailings dams. Provisions 
appearing in eight of the contracts reviewed are limited 
to an obligation on the mining company to “secure and 
reinforce all water dams, tailings or excavation ponds to 
prevent collapse,”64 or to ensure “all dams, whether for 
water, debris or waste, [are] safe to resist collapse.”65
Upstream dams (in particular when they are immediately 
upstream of communities) should be explicitly banned 
by the contract and tailings storage should use the best 
available technology, including filtered tailings or dry 
stack.66 The contract should require that the mining plan 
demonstrate that the tailings dam follows the latest 
global safety standards, such as the Safety First Guidelines 
for Responsible Mine Tailings Management,67 and that 
ongoing maintenance and remediation activities will be 
conducted. Furthermore, in the EIA, companies should 
model the risk of tailings dam failure due to climate-
related risks like flooding and heavy rainfall, making 
sure to assess all possible scenarios of mode of failure, 
their probabilities, the severity of the impact on local 
communities, and the corresponding costs. The EMP 
should include the obligation to demonstrate that the 
tailings dam is adequately monitored for failure risk, 
with the goal of achieving zero tailings dam failures. 
Further, the EMP should provide for both internal and 
external inspection systems, with the external inspection 
system involving technologies like satellite-based remote 
sensing, public disclosure of the inspection results, 
and a participatory monitoring role for local communities.
2.2.4 Closure Plans
Mining is a long-term but temporary use of land. As mining 
operations wind down, the site is rehabilitated according 
to the mine closure plan. Some governments require this 
plan to be submitted before mining begins, as it often 
influences how companies choose to construct the mine. 
Over the decades-long life of a mine and the decades post-
closure, environmental conditions may change drastically. 
To ensure that the rehabilitated mine site remains stable 
over time, mine closure criteria should be designed 
through a climate change risk management lens, where 
the magnitude of the risk depends on the likelihood 
of a particular climate event and the consequences of 
that event.68 For instance, insufficient water and high 
temperatures make it harder to re-establish the previous 
vegetation in rehabilitation efforts and there may be a need 
for drought-resistant vegetation, which could increase 
closure cost; ‘bio-mining’ and the growth of fibrous 
plants on old tailings dams to extract minerals could also 
help address the risk of tailings dam failure post-closure. 
Early assessment of likely and unlikely climate risks 
enables companies to devise resilient, robust closure 
plans. This framework allows companies to assess 
whether a risk that is unlikely to occur in the short term 
is, in fact, highly likely to occur in the long term and 
evaluate how to best prevent it. Importantly, the closure 
plan is meant to be iterative; each successive version 
represents a more efficient solution.
More than half of the contracts analyzed—notably 
those concluded by Guinea and Mozambique—include 
provisions that require the mining company to plan in 
advance for the closure of the mine69 and the environmental 
rehabilitation of the mine site.70 For example, two contracts 
from Mozambique71 require mining companies to comply 
with closure and rehabilitation obligations in mining 
and environmental laws and regulations, and in the 
project’s EMPs, and to develop and periodically update a 
mine closure plan:
Obligations in the rehabilitation and closure 
phase. The Mining Concessionaire must, in relation 
to its Mining Concession in the Contract Area, 
comply with all the rehabilitation and closure 
obligations described in the Mining Law, in the 
Environmental Regulation for the Mining Activity, 
and in the Environmental Management Plan and 
Environmental Management Program approved 
pursuant to that regulation and this Contract.72 
The Mine Concessionaire must develop and 
update periodically, every five years, as part of 
the Environmental Management Program, and 
in consultation with the beneficiary community 
and the local authority, a Mine Closure Program, 
which prepares the beneficiary community for the 
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT  |  11
 July 2021
eventual closure of the Mining Operations. Such 
a program must be articulated with the Local  
Development Agreement […].73
However, none of the contracts requires the 
concessionaire to integrate climate risks into the 
development of the closure plans.
Contracts should require closure plans to be submitted 
at the beginning of the project at the time of the EIA 
submission74 and describe how the mining company 
intends to avoid or mitigate the environmental impacts 
associated with closure, as well as how it plans to 
rehabilitate the mine site. Rehabilitation strategies should 
reflect an understanding of the changing relationship 
between the ecosystem and the climate. The contract 
should include a requirement to model the long-term 
sustainability of rehabilitation projects and set climate-
responsive targets.
Additionally, the closure plan should include a section on 
the expected cost of mine closure that takes into account 
climate-related risks and provides a clear mechanism to 
ensure that the company meets the financial obligations 
associated with closure. Finally, the closure plan should 
require the company to actively monitor the mine site for 
a period of time post-closure and the company should 
remain liable for related negative environmental impacts 
that occur within several years of closure.
3 Conclusion
The investor–state contracts reviewed, concluded by five 
fragile states in Africa (Chad, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Guinea, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone), largely do 
not regulate the mining sector’s contribution to climate 
change mitigation or the climate-related impacts of the 
sector. In some cases, this may be because there are 
relevant laws that apply. In other cases, where robust laws 
do not exist, contracts with permissive provisions stand to 
worsen the climate-related impacts of the project on the 
environment and communities. It is timely for governments 
to review and update mining legal frameworks—
including domestic laws, investor–state contracts, 
CDAs, and MMDAs—to both increase climate resilience 
and align the contributions of the mining sector with 
sustainable development objectives.
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Convention Minière, 2018, https://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-5699672631/view#/pdf; Fria, Bauxite Kimbo S.A.U, 
Bauxite Kimbo Limited, Concession Agreement, 2018, https://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-3622819596/view#/
pdf; Santou, Guinea Evergreen Mining Intelligence SA, TBEA Co Ltd, Concession Agreement, 2017, https://resourcecontracts.org/
contract/ocds-591adf-0842187625/view#/pdf; Boke-Telimele, Société de Développement des Mines Internationales du Henan 
SA, Compagnie de Développement des Mines Internationales Henan Chine Guinée, Convention de base amendée et consolidée, 
2018, https://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-9306677863/view#/pdf; Bel Air Mining, Alufer Mining, Alufer Mining 
Limited, Concession, 2016, https://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-8002546923/view#/pdf; Trik, Société des Mines de 
Mandiana, Avocet Mining, Managem, Concession, 2016, https://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-1880406409/view#/
pdf; SAG, Societe Aurifere de Guinee, Golden Shamrock, Anglogold Ashanti, Amendment, 2016, https://resourcecontracts.org/
contract/ocds-591adf-2707180369/view#/pdf; Twigg Exploration and Mining, Concession, 2018, https://resourcecontracts.org/
contract/ocds-591adf-3253769280/view#/pdf; Capitol Resources, Concession, 2017, https://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-
591adf-1233175911/view#/pdf.
70 All of the contracts mentioned in the footnote above, as well as SL Mining Limited, Concession, 2017, https://resourcecontracts.
org/contract/ocds-591adf-9176507089/view#/pdf; and SierraMin Bauxite Limited, Concession, 2017, https://resourcecontracts.org/
contract/ocds-591adf-4376389326/view#/pdf.
71 Twigg Exploration and Mining, Concession, 2018, https://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-3253769280/view#/pdf; 
Capitol Resources, Concession, 2017, https://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-1233175911/view#/pdf.
72 Capitol Resources, Concession, 2017, Art. 9.1, https://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-1233175911/view#/pdf.
73 Capitol Resources, Concession, 2017, Art. 9.4.3, https://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-1233175911/view#/pdf.
74 Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development [IGF], Clémence Naré, Suzy H. Nikièma, Marina 
Ruete, Kristi Disney Bruckner, Jenifer Hill, Jill Baker, Carolina Leseigneur Torres, and Luke Danielson, IGF Guidance for Governments: 
Improving Legal Frameworks for Environmental and Social Impact Assessment and Management (Winnipeg: IISD, June 2020), 31, 
https://www.iisd.org/publications/igf-guidance-governments-esia. 
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